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In October, the euro area countries submitted their draft 
budgetary plans for 2020 to the European Commission 
(EC) in fulfilment of their commitments within the European 
economic policy surveillance framework. According to 
these plans, the aggregate euro area budget deficit will 
remain practically unchanged in 2020, at 0.8% of GDP 
(see Chart 1), while public debt will continue to trend 
downwards, falling from 86.4% of GDP in 2019 to 85.1% 
in 2020, assisted by an environment of very low interest 
rates and moderate economic growth.
The draft budgetary plans indicate that the euro area 
aggregate fiscal stance will be slightly expansionary for 
the second consecutive year, so that the area’s structural 
primary deficit will increase by 0.4 percentage points (pp) 
in 2020 (see Charts 2 and 3).1 This stance stems from the 
fiscal policies of the countries that make up the euro area. 
Specifically, as seen in Chart 3, Germany and the 
Netherlands plan to ease their fiscal policies in 2020, as 
they have done in 2019, with a reduction in the primary 
structural surplus of 0.7 and 0.8 pp of their potential GDP, 
respectively. Among the largest economies in the area, 
Italy also proposes to conduct a fiscal expansion. 
Meanwhile, France and Spain foresee a neutral stance, 
with a structural deficit that will remain practically 
unchanged. 
In its initial assessment of these fiscal plans, the EC has 
indicated that eight countries (Belgium, Finland, France, 
Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia and Spain) have a high 
risk of non-compliance with the requirements of the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).2 In fact, a majority of the 
countries that are failing to meet their medium-term 
objectives,3 within the framework of the “preventive arm” 
of the SGP, or that are not reducing their high levels of 
debt in accordance with European fiscal rules have 
discontinued the fiscal consolidation required to rebuild 
the necessary budgetary room for manoeuvre.
In this context, the European Fiscal Board (EFB) 
recommended in June a neutral fiscal policy stance for 
the euro area at aggregate level, on the grounds that the 
slowdown in the European economy is temporary and 
output is close to potential. According to this institution, 
the aggregate neutral orientation of budgetary policy 
should be the result of appropriate differences across 
countries, so that those with fiscal space4 should make 
full or partial use of it, while the other countries should 
keep their public finances on a path of improvement in 
line with SGP requirements. 
As detailed above, therefore, the budgetary plans of the 
countries are not necessarily in line with SGP 
requirements or EFB recommendations. Specifically, 
some countries at risk of non-compliance and without 
any fiscal space, such as Italy (see Chart 4), plan to 
conduct a budgetary expansion that would contravene 
EFB recommendations. At the same time, other 
countries, such as Germany and the Netherlands, that 
have space available, could conduct a more 
expansionary fiscal policy and still comply with SGP 
requirements and EFB recommendations.
The achievement of an appropriate fiscal policy stance in 
the euro area, resulting from the actions of the individual 
countries based on the principles discussed above, is 
especially important in the current context in which, 
although the accommodative stance of monetary policy 
has been intensified, signs of activity weakness continue 
to be discerned and notable downside risks remain. In 
this respect, in recent months, opinions have been 
expressed in various quarters emphasising the need to 
rebalance the economic policy mix and to consider 
greater fiscal activism at European level, especially in 
view of the risks to economic growth and the low current 
cost of public borrowing.5 In these circumstances, the 
effectiveness of a possible fiscal stimulus in terms of 
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1	 	The	primary	structural	balance	is	a	measure	of	the	budgetary	balance	that	reflects	the	discretionary	decisions	of	the	authorities,	since	
it	discounts	both	the	effects	of	the	cycle	on	the	public	finances	and	interest	expense.
2  This assessment is set out in the document on the overall assessment of 2020 budgetary plans. 
3  The medium-term objective of a member country is the structural balance that such country needs to achieve in order to ensure 
compliance	with	the	3%	deficit	target,	taking	into	account	the	need	to	converge	towards	prudent	debt	levels	and	the	future	budgetary	
requirements arising from population ageing.
4	 	Defined	as	the	distance	between	its	structural	balance	and	the	medium-term	objective	(MTO)	of	the	SGP.
5	 	This	 call	 for	 greater	 fiscal	 activism	 has	 grown	 recently.	 See,	 for	 example,	 L.	 de	 Guindos	 (2019),	 “Improving	 macroeconomic	
stabilization in the euro area”, speech at the conference “Global Interdependence Center Central Banking”, Madrid, 3 October. The 
call	for	flexible	use	of	the	SGP	contained	in	the	guidance	addressed	in	September	2019	to	the	Economic	Commissioner	by	the	new	
President of the European Commission should be seen in the same light.
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SOURCES: European Commission, OECD and own calculations.
a The size of the circles denotes the level of public debt (as a % of GDP). The colour denotes the risk of non-compliance with the SGP: red (risk of 
non-compliance), orange (broadly compliant) and green (compliant).
b Data for Greece and Cyprus not included so as not to distort the picture.
c Expansion of public investment in countries with fiscal space in 2019 if all the fiscal space is used. Own calculations, using the NiGEM Global 
Macroeconomic Model.
d ZLB: zero lower bound (zero nominal interest rates).
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growth could be enhanced, insofar as monetary policy is 
operating at around the effective lower bound on interest 
rates, so that, in principle, rates would not rise in the event 
of a fiscal expansion. 
Among the instruments available, a fiscal policy focused 
on boosting public investment could have a significant 
impact, since this instrument (according to the available 
empirical evidence) has the most potent associated 
multiplier effect and the capacity to generate greater 
effects in the region as a whole and to increase the 
economy’s potential growth.6 The fact that public 
investment has suffered a notable decline since the crisis 
and that its current levels are relatively low in those 
countries that have budgetary room for manoeuvre, 
reinforces the argument in favour of this type of strategy 
(see Chart 5).
However, achieving an improved economic policy mix at 
European level is extraordinarily complex in the current 
institutional framework; fiscal policies are designed at 
national level and there are no mechanisms to help 
internalise the importance of achieving an appropriate 
policy mix at aggregate level, apart from the advisory 
work of the EFB. Consequently, fiscal instruments 
centralised at euro area level need to be designed to 
enable a fiscal policy appropriate for the euro area as a 
whole to be automatically achieved. Certain initiatives 
that attempt to fill part of this institutional gap, such as the 
recently agreed budgetary instrument for convergence 
and competitiveness (BICC)7 and the current European 
investment plan (EFSI)8 should be welcomed. 
In order to illustrate the possible macroeconomic impact 
of a strategy of budgetary expansion within the current 
limits of the European fiscal policy institutional framework, 
Chart 6 presents a simulation exercise performed with the 
NIGEM macro-econometric model.9 Specifically, a 
temporary boost to public investment is considered, 
exclusively in those countries with fiscal space available, 
assuming it is fully utilised in 2020, with a magnitude of 
0.6 pp of GDP for the euro area as a whole.10 Chart 6 
shows two scenarios, one in which there is no monetary 
policy reaction and interest rates remain unchanged, and 
another in which there is a monetary policy reaction in 
accordance with historical patterns, with an increase in 
interest rates to offset the inflationary pressures resulting 
from the fiscal expansion. The results of the simulations 
indicate that an expansionary fiscal policy focused on 
public investment would raise euro area GDP and inflation, 
relative to the baseline scenario. Moreover, these 
estimated impacts would be greater with a monetary 
policy that keeps interest rates unchanged at their lower 
bound. In this case (more in line with the current context), 
the effect on euro area GDP would reach its peak in the 
first year, with an increase in output of up to 0.5 pp above 
its baseline level, and slowly fade thereafter.11, 12  The 
effect on inflation, in contrast, would be greatest in the 
second year, when the rate would stand 0.25 pp above its 
baseline level.
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6	 	See,	 inter-alia,	Banco	de	España	(2017),	Annual	Report	2016,	Chapter	4,	“fiscal	policy	 in	the	euro	area”;	Ó.	Arce,	S.	Hurtado	and	
C. Thomas	(2016),	“Policy	spillovers	and	synergies	in	a	monetary	union”,	ECB	WP	1942,	August;	V.	A.	Ramey	(2019),	“Ten	years	after	
the	financial	crises:	what	have	we	learned	from	the	renaissance	in	fiscal	research?”,	NBER	WP	25531;	M.	Alloza,	P.	Burriel,	J.	J.	Pérez	
(2019),	 “Fiscal	 policies	 in	 the	 euro	 area:	 revisiting	 the	 size	 of	 spillovers”,	 Journal	 of	 Macroeconomics,	 forthcoming;	 M.	 Alloza,	
B. Cozmanca,	M.	Ferdinandusse	and	P.	Jacquinot	(2019),	“Fiscal	spillovers	in	a	monetary	union”,	ECB	Economic	Bulletin,	Issue	1/2019.
7  For an explanation of this instrument, see https://www.consilium.europa.eu/es/policies/emu-deepening/bicc-faq.
8	 	Although	the	EFSI	has	mobilised	a	significant	amount	of	investment,	the	European	Court	of	auditors	has	concluded	that	for	some	of	
the	 projects	 financed,	 EFSI	 support	 just	 replaced	 other	 financing	 (see	 https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/NewsItem.
aspx?nid=9010).
9  The NiGEM model is built by the UK National Institute of Economic and Social Research. The model documentation is available at 
https://nimodel.niesr.ac.uk/.
10	 	Specifically,	the	fiscal	stimuli	of	Germany	(with	a	figure	close	to	1.9%	of	potential	GDP),	the	Netherlands	(1%)	and	Austria	(0.3%)	
would stand out.    
11	 	According	to	this	model,	the	spillover	effects	of	this	fiscal	stimulus	on	the	GDP	of	the	large	economies	of	the	euro	area,	such	as	
Spain, Italy and France, are positive, although moderate, amounting to around 0.2 pp of GDP, with respect to the baseline scenario. 
12  In line with the empirical evidence, the effects associated with an increase in public investment would be greater, especially in the 
medium	 term,	 than	 those	 obtained	 by	 simulating	 a	 fiscal	 stimulus	 through	 government	 consumption.	 In	 this	 case,	 with	 an	
accommodative	monetary	policy,	euro	area	GDP	would	stand	0.4	pp	higher	than	its	baseline	level	in	the	first	year,	but	this	effect	
would subsequently fade much more quickly than in the case of a public investment stimulus.
